Bary Pradelski

CNRS researcher (National Center for Scientific Research, France)

Bary previously studied Mathematics at the Technische Universität, Munich, Germany; École Polytechnique, Paris, France; and the University of Oxford, where he read for the MSc in Mathematics and the Foundations of Computer Science and studied under the supervision of Professor Peyton Young (Economics) and Professor Pierre Tarrès (Mathematics).

His interest lies in evolutionary game theory and in particular in learning dynamics. He is currently interested in the combination of the theory of matching in cooperative game theory on the one hand and limited-rationality learning models on the other hand. This research may help to understand evolution of stability and instability in large markets.

Bary also has an interest in the applications of game theory to finance and the engineering sciences.

Working Paper

Nax, H.H., Pradelski, B.S.R. and Young, H.P. (2013). The evolution of core stability in decentralized matching markets.
Pradelski, B. and Tarres, P. (2017). The evolution of institutions in the medium run.
Clemm von Hohenberg, B., Maes, M. and Pradelski, B. (2017). Micro influence and macro dynamics of opinions: a field experiment.
Pradelski, B and Leshno, J.D. (2017). Efficient price discovery and information in the decentralized assignment game.

Published Research

Pradelski, B. and Nax, H.H (2016). Core stability and core selection in a decentralized matching market. Games. 7(2). 10.
Pradelski, B. and Nax, H.H (2015). Evolutioary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games. International Journal of Game Theory. 44(4). 903-932.
Pradelski, B. and Peyton Young, H. (2012). Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems. Games and Economic Behaviour. 75(2). 882-897.